Evaluator Bias in Performance Evaluation of Online Transportation Driver: Empirical Study in Indonesia by Mursita, Lufi Yuwana
THE INDONESIAN JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 
Vol. 23, No. 1, Jan 2020 | https://ijar-iaikapd.or.id/ | DOI: 10.33312/ijar.473 
Page 127 - 154 
*Corresponding author: lufi.yuwana@perbanas.ac.id 
  
 
Evaluator Bias in Performance Evaluation of Online 
Transportation Driver: Empirical Study in Indonesia 
 
LUFI YUWANA MURSITA* 
Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Ekonomi Perbanas Surabaya 
 
Abstract: Online transportation as a developing industry in Indonesia applies bonus-
or-terminate incentives based on both objective and subjective performance evaluation. 
Regarding bias problems often found in the subjective evaluation, this paper aims to 
examine factors that influence bias in performance evaluation of the online 
transportation drivers. The data were collected by an online survey to users of online 
transportation in Indonesia using convenience sampling. Multiple regression analysis 
was utilized to analyze 163 data. The result shows that users of online transportation 
services tend to generate a biased rating, which is leniency bias. Altruism and 
knowledge of incentives scheme as the users’ internal factors significantly affect the 
biased evaluation. On the other hand, the external factors of the users, i.e., the frequency 
of usage and evaluation timing, do not significantly affect the biased evaluation. 
However, the other external factor, i.e., travel distance and duration, is found to affect 
the leniency bias positively. This paper concludes that more information related to the 
evaluation object and the inherent characteristic of an individual as the effect of 
collectivist national culture may lead to the generation of biased performance 
evaluation by the evaluator to help evaluated party avoiding penalty/termination in the 
competitive working environment.  
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Abstrak: Transportasi daring sebagai industri yang sedang berkembang di Indonesia 
menerapkan insentif bonus-or-terminate berdasarkan evaluasi kinerja objektif dan 
subjektif. Berkaitan dengan masalah bias yang sering ditemukan dalam evaluasi 
subjektif, penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji faktor-faktor yang menentukan adanya 
bias dalam evaluasi kinerja pengemudi transportasi daring. Data dikumpulkan melalui 
survei daring kepada pengguna transportasi daring di Indonesia dengan teknik 
convenience sampling. Analisis regresi berganda digunakan untuk menganalisis 163 
data. Hasilnya menunjukkan bahwa pengguna layanan transportasi daring cenderung 
menghasilkan penilaian yang bias, yaitu berupa leniency bias. Altruisme dan 
pengetahuan skema insentif sebagai faktor internal pengguna ditemukan secara negatif 
memengaruhi leniency bias. Di sisi lain, faktor eksternal pengguna, yaitu frekuensi 
penggunaan dan waktu evaluasi, ditemukan tidak memengaruhi bias tersebut. Namun, 
faktor eksternal lainnya, yakni jarak dan durasi perjalanan, ditemukan berpengaruh 
positif terhadap leniency bias. Hasil penelitian ini memberikan kesimpulan bahwa 
banyaknya perolehan informasi terkait dengan objek yang dievaluasi dan adanya 
karakteristik yang melekat pada individu (yang dapat menjadi indikasi budaya 
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nasional) dapat mengarahkan pada terjadinya evaluasi kinerja yang bias yang 
sebenarnya dimaksudkan untuk membantu pihak yang dievaluasi agar terhindar dari 
sanksi/penghentian dalam persaingan kompetitif di lingkungan kerjanya. 
 
Kata Kunci: Altruism; Bias Evaluasi; Leniency Bias; Transportasi Daring 
 
1. Introduction 
The use of subjectivity is the result of the consideration that objective measures do 
not adequately represent the actual performance of employees (Gibbs et al., 2004; 
Merchant and Van der Stede, 2017; Zábojník, 2014). This type of incentive is best 
suited for complex work environments, where job design involves multiple tasks and 
decision-making, as well as an unpredictable environment (Gibbs et al., 2004). The 
online transportation industry meets the criteria of an unpredictable environment since 
more companies enter the market, and competitors’ innovation becomes more 
aggressive, so the users’ bargaining power tends to get bigger. 
Subjectivity is widely used in performance measurement and evaluation, both as a 
primary and complementary measure, in addition to objective (formulaic) measures. 
This subjective-weighted performance evaluation is applied to online transportation in 
Indonesia, such as Go-Jek and Grab. The performance of an online transportation driver 
is determined by two measures, i.e., formula-based, in the form of multiplied service 
points in each of the service types, and the subjective rating which is given by customers 
(Go-Jek, 2018; Grab, 2017). Both of them determine the level of performance and the 
number of incentives received by the driver. The achievement of formula-based 
incentives determines the number of daily bonus can be obtained by the drivers. The 
number of received orders in a day is translated into accumulated service points to be 
compared with the minimum threshold for obtaining the bonus. If the drivers pass the 
minimum points, they have an opportunity to get a bonus. However, the opportunity is 
canceled out if the drivers’ performance rating below the prescribed standard level. A 
poor rating indicates low customer satisfaction and unmet service quality. Therefore,  
in addition to failure to receive the bonus, the under-performing drivers may also 
receive a penalty (i.e., account suspension) or even termination. Thus, the online 
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transportation industry specifically applies subjective evaluation by service users to 
complete the deficiency in formula-based evaluation, which cannot assure the quality 
of the service. According to its nature, the incentives scheme in place is called “bonus-
or-terminate” (Maestri 2014), which combines both positive and negative incentives in 
a system. 
The use of subjectivity in online transportation performance evaluations and 
incentives makes “customers are managers” because the rating they provide determines 
the incentives for the driver (Nastiti, 2018). However, this subjective rating system by 
customers potentially causes some problems. The poor practice of performance 
evaluation can lead to the dysfunctional behaviors of the drivers, such as falsifying 
service orders to obtain a perfect rating (Zaenudin, 2018), which finally impacts on 
driver’s reluctance to work (Nastiti, 2018). Furthermore, the driver’s final rating comes 
from evaluations by different evaluators. Nonetheless, the information for evaluators is 
limited to what they know during the duration of using the driver’s service, which 
cannot be repeatedly learned by a customer from the same driver in a row. It means that 
the necessary information to provide the drivers’ performance evaluation is inadequate 
because it is only obtained from an event at a single point of time (cross-sectional). This 
condition indicates the inefficiency and tendency to bias. Thus, this also leads to a 
decrease in drivers’ work motivation. 
Previous research has shown that subjective evaluation can lead to bias, such as 
favoritism (Ittner et al., 2003; Prendergast and Topel, 1993, 1996), centrality bias (Bol 
2011; Moers 2005), leniency bias (Moers, 2005; Prendergast and Topel, 1993), outcome 
effects (Long, Mertins, and Vansant 2015; Mertins, Salbador, and Long 2013; Ghosh 
2005), and the hindsight effect (Hawkins and Hastie, 1990), where performance 
evaluations are perceived to be non-fair and inconsistent for employees. These biases 
cause the phenomenon of a discrepancy between the actual performance and the given 
rating, either less or more, even when the total frequency of the evaluation is high. Two 
systematic biases which have the effect of suppressing and inflating employee 
performance ratings are sequentially referred to as centrality bias and leniency bias (Bol 
2011; Moers 2005). In the end, these biases have the same negative impact on the 
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sluggishness of the work of online transportation drivers. The more extended use of 
these biased, subjective weighting triggers the question of what actual goals and impacts 
of evaluation system implementation are expected for employees and management. 
Research has found that leniency bias has a more complicated effect on an agent’s 
performance than the centrality bias (Golman and Bhatia, 2012). Lenient rating from 
the evaluator leads to a higher expected wage of the employee. This bias provides a 
higher rating and payment for employees regardless of the level of their actual 
performance. For below-average performers, this rating causes laziness to exert their 
work effort because they have been able to receive reasonable payment without working 
harder. On the other hand, for above-average performers, this rating does not have an 
impact on future performance (Bol 2011). In the short term, leniency bias can cause a 
higher level of employee satisfaction. However, in the long-term, it can lead to less 
incentive to work since the resulted rating assures a good wage for all employees. 
Therefore, leniency bias is the focus of this study. Besides, there is a limited number of 
studies on leniency bias (Gong et al. 2019). 
The subjectivity in performance evaluation for incentive determination appears to 
be problematic and only effective as well as gives more positive impacts to the agent 
when the evaluator does have sufficient knowledge and ability about the object of 
evaluation (drivers’ performance). Other factors determine the effectiveness of this 
subjective measure. However, evaluations made by evaluators who are not part of the 
company, i.e., the users of the transportation services, lead to higher possible bias in the 
process and evaluation results. This research is interested in finding what variables can 
determine the existence of a biased rating, especially lenient rating. Therefore, this 
study specifically aims to examine the determinants of leniency bias in subjective 
evaluation by the Indonesian users of online transportation. This paper focuses on the 
evaluator’s perspective, who has the discretion to provide a subjective rating. 
This research is important as it indicates the services users’ behavior as 
performance evaluators of the online transportation service who tend to be naive. There 
are only a small number of studies have been conducted to test the bias in subjective 
performance evaluation from the evaluator's side. This research is also necessary 
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because most research on incentives is in the context of positive incentives but rarely 
on negative incentives. In this study, the test is performed in the context of positive and 
negative incentives applied at the same time. Both types of incentives which determine 
the behavioral tendency of the subjective performance evaluation by the online 
transportation users who consider the fact of drivers’ (evaluated party) working 
environment competitiveness is highly interesting to identify. 
Through an online survey, the research shows that one of three factors related to 
the usage of online transportation services is the determinant of leniency bias, i.e., travel 
distance and duration. The two remaining factors, i.e., frequency of use and evaluation 
timing, are not significantly correlated with the bias. This first part of the results 
indicates the importance of enough information about the drivers for users to provide a 
more accurate subjective rating. This study also finds that altruism and knowledge of 
the incentive significantly affect leniency bias. This result indicates that internal factors 
have a stronger effect on the biased, subjective performance evaluation than the external 
factors. It also reflects the depiction of collectivist national culture on the users’ 
behavior. 
This study contributes empirically by showing the behavioral implications of work 
incentives, which usually seen from an economic perspective. Besides, it also 
contributes to the behavioral research literature by showing the determinant of the bias 
of subjective weighted performance evaluation, which can be developed into a more 
established theoretical framework. It practically contributes to evaluators and 
companies by pointing out what matters which encourage bias and injustice in the 
process and results of employees’ performance evaluations by service users. Thus, some 
steps can be taken to anticipate the occurrence of bias, either by improving the incentive 
scheme or motivating evaluators to evaluate more objectively. 
This remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section consists of 
an explanation of online transportation and hypotheses development based on a 
theoretical framework. Then the following section is an overview of the method for the 
study and followed by the results and the discussion. This paper closes with the 
explanation of conclusion, implication, limitation, and suggestions for future research. 
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2. Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development  
2.1 The History and Development of Online Transportation in Indonesia 
Online transportation in Indonesia has developed since the idea to empower online 
ojek. Ojek or motorbike taxi is riding service provided by motorcyclists to customers 
who want to reach their ordered destination. It is one means of transportation available 
in this observed country. There are many ojek in Indonesia due to the high number of 
motorcyclists, especially in the cities. Previously, they have some places to be their post 
for getting customers, such as in front of traditional markets, malls, offices, and others. 
However, demand for ojek is difficult to increase or even not stable, at least, because of 
two reasons. First, it provides pick up services to a specific destination, which causes 
fare to be higher than other public transportations, such as city bus and angkot (city 
transport). Second, based on convenience, some people prefer a car taxi to ojek because 
it protects customers from the hot weather in the city. Thus, ojek users are mostly people 
who have subscribed to and regularly use the services. Therefore, the competition is 
high and causes a lack of work enthusiasm for the drivers. 
The problem then inspired an entrepreneur to initiate business, which empowers 
the ojek by utilizing online devices to assist ojek services. This service is provided under 
Go-Jek corporation. It is explained in their website that Go-Jek was established in 2010 
as a motorcycle ride-hailing phone service that has evolved into an on-demand mobile 
platform and a cutting-edge app to provides extensive range services by now with 
transportation services still becomes the main business (Go-Jek, 2018). Through the 
online service, the motorcyclist can easily reach the customer and provide customized 
orders. Customers are also simplified in looking for drivers to fulfill their pickup needs. 
The pickup and destination point are also can be determined more accurately by the 
customers, which ease drivers to find both locations.  
Drivers join Go-Jek company as partners, not employees, in which they are given 
identity and license to provide services by using the app and also have many kinds of 
work support, such as health and accident cover and financial services and insurance 
(Go-Jek, 2018). Partners differ from employees as they ideally join Go-Jek not to make 
it as the primary source of income or activity but as an additional one. Unfortunately, 
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most of the drivers consider this activity as their primary source of income because they 
understand this as a better work opportunity than the other kinds of jobs in 
transportation. This service is now available in 50 cities in Indonesia, with over 400,000 
total drivers (Go-Jek, 2018). 
Besides Go-Jek, the other platforms also joined the industry, i.e., Grab and Uber. 
Grab and Uber formerly only provided online car-taxi services. By the increasing needs 
of online ojek, they also expand their services to this area of service. Therefore, they 
build the online transportation industry in Indonesia, with both of them as the most 
prominent platforms since Uber was acquired by Grab (Keeton-Olsen, 2018). This 
industry is phenomenal and very helpful to society. Moreover, it also expands its 
services not only in providing transportation (motorbike and car), but also facilities for 
shopping (food, medicine, ticket, and mart), payment (mobile credit top-up and bills), 
and even lifestyle (massage, cleaning, beauty, and automotive).  
As previously explained, the drivers’ performance is evaluated by two kinds of 
performance measures; they are objective and subjective measures. The objective 
measure is based on the number of orders served by the drivers. In contrast, subjective 
evaluation is based on the rating provided by the customers. The usage of the objective 
measure has almost no problems. However, subjective evaluation is somewhat 
controversial since it is given by the parties who do not come from the internal 
company. The arbitrary rating given by customers can lead to the sluggishness of work 
or even resignation. It is because customers have limited information to give an 
evaluation. 
On the other hand, the online transportation industry uses a double incentive 
system (carrot and stick). Good performance leads to more incentives. Otherwise, bad 
performance causes a penalty until dismissal. This system gives more pressure to the 
drivers who deal with highly competitive work dynamics due to the high number of 
drivers employed by the industry. 
2.2 Negative Incentives versus Positive Incentives 
Most of the existing incentive studies, particularly in the field of experiments, 
focused on positive incentives (Lourenço et al. 2018). In a bonus-or-terminate scheme 
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that combines both types of incentives, a positive evaluation is expected to come with 
monetary compensation. In contrast, negative incentives can lead to dismissal (Maestri 
2014). Therefore, employees are partly motivated by the threat of dismissal and partly 
by the expectation of receiving bonuses (Fuchs 2015; Maestri 2014). However, in this 
case, the determination of the basis for obtaining such incentives is based on 
performance evaluations by users of online transportation services that have several 
limitations. 
The difference between negative incentives and positive incentives is important 
because the prospect theory states that people react differently to gains and losses 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). However, the negativity bias phenomenon shows that 
people tend to weigh more substantial on the negative information rather than positive 
information. Similarly, people will avoid a loss (negative incentives) rather than benefit 
from a gain (positive incentives). That is, negative incentives have a stronger effect than 
positive incentives. Thus, in the presence of negative incentives, employees increase 
their efforts in order to avoid adverse situations more than they do to raise positive 
incentives (Baumeister et al. 2001). Employees change their performance to meet the 
threshold and avoid termination (Lourenço et al. 2018). 
On the other hand, the existence of goals serves as a reference point in prospect 
theory in which the outcome is evaluated and classified as either gain or loss (Heath, 
Larrick, and Wu 1999). In the negative incentives, goals separate the gain (keeping the 
job) from the loss domain (penalty/termination). Nonetheless, by achieving a goal, 
people are in a better position to gain a future positive outcome. Otherwise, people who 
are below the goal will change their habits in order to meet the prescribing level and 
avoid penalty/termination. Therefore, goals play a role in prospect theory (Lourenço et 
al. 2018). Bringing back to the context of online transportation, the use of negative and 
positive incentives at the same time may imply two drivers’ behavioral tendencies 
regarding the achievement of the goals itself. 
2.3 The Use and Impact of Subjectivity in Performance Evaluation 
Management accounting researchers found one of the determinants of the use of 
subjective incentives is the extent to which the achievement of incentives target with 
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objective measures is difficult and leads to significant consequences if not met (Gibbs 
et al. 2004). Subjective incentives allow the evaluator to use additional relevant 
information that emerged during the measurement and evaluation period. Some 
researchers have found that subjectively weighted incentives aim to reduce perceived 
weaknesses in quantitative (formula-based) performance measures (Gibbs et al. 2004; 
Zábojník 2014). Other researchers explained, in the use of subjective evaluations on 
incentives scheme in conjunction with formula-based (objective) evaluations, there is 
an influence on each other among those measures. It was found that the level and 
controllability of objective measures influenced subjective performance evaluations 
(Bol and Smith, 2011). The lower and more uncontrollable, the higher the use of 
subjective measures, and vice versa. In general, it can be concluded that the use of 
subjective incentives can improve alignment between employee and company interests 
and reduce employee risk by closing the objective measure weakness. 
Since subjective measure equips objective measures, its use in determining 
incentives has a positive impact. As economists explained, the use of subjectively 
weighted incentives increases the employees’ satisfaction, which further increases 
productivity and corporate profits (Gibbs et al. 2004). Other researchers found that 
incentives with subjective weights can also encourage employee’s knowledge sharing 
behavior because employees will get more benefits or results by doing that (Cheng and 
Coyte, 2014). From these studies, it is known that the purpose of using subjectivity in 
performance evaluation and determination of incentives among others is to improve 
employee’s motivation and performance as well as attitudes and positive ways in order 
to achieve it. 
Some researchers revealed that subjectivity means requiring judgment in action, 
including in assessing and determining incentives (Moers 2005; Gibbs et al. 2004; M. 
J. Gibbs et al. 2009). Evaluators have the discretion to provide assessment and 
evaluation because there are no clear measurement standards. However, some of these 
researchers also pointed out that if evaluators are unfair and biased, thus subjectivity in 
performance evaluations can lead to a substantial risk to employees, particularly on 
satisfaction and performance (Gibbs et al. 2004). In general, evaluations and incentives 
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of subjective measures will only be effective when evaluators are fair and unbiased in 
judgment. 
Economic researchers proved that subjectivity improves satisfaction and 
performance only when there is sufficient trust between the evaluator and the evaluated 
party (Gibbs et al. 2004). The results of this study are supported by accounting and 
business researchers who suggested the results of their surveys in the context of the 
public sector. Subjectivity in the practice of performance evaluation reduces the clarity 
of the mission according to employees and their trust in the evaluator, thereby 
decreasing motivation (Van Rinsum and Verbeeten, 2012). Both studies showed that 
the existence of trust also determines the effectiveness of subjective evaluation and 
incentives. The existence of trust implies that there is no bias and injustice in the system 
practice. 
2.4 Altruism 
Altruism is a voluntary action to help others in issues related to their work. 
Altruism is one part of Organizational Citizenship Behavior (OCB) (Posdakoff and 
MacKenzie, 1994). It is fostered, channeled, or impeded by the socialization 
experience, which varies across cultures (Draguns, 2013). When their altruism is high, 
people will not monitor the agent’s performance even if the agent keeps their best 
performance (Giebe and Gürtler, 2012), i.e., biased evaluation. Previous studies have 
found the effect of altruism. It undermines the threat of dismissal but increases the 
credibility of bonuses or incentives (Dur and Tichem, 2015). In other words, higher 
altruism may lead to a higher bonus, while productivity may be lower. However, the 
effectiveness of the incentives system is altered (Van Rinsum and Verbeeten, 2012). 
Previous research has investigated altruism. A behavioral study indicated that 
leniency bias occurs as the result of an evaluation that is used to determine the 
employee’s pay and the level of altruism of the evaluator (Golman and Bhatia, 2012). 
The high level of altruism can lead to the limited effectiveness of incentives (Van 
Rinsum and Verbeeten, 2012). Experimental research found that altruistic behavior is 
more required and less optional for women rather than for men. Thus, gender differs 
performance evaluation and reward recommendation, even at the same level of altruism 
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(Heilman and Chen, 2005). Another research showed that altruistic motive mediates the 
relationship between helping behavior and reward allocation in performance evaluation 
(Johnson et al. 2002). 
2.5 Hypotheses Development 
The previous research mentioned three things which affect performance rating 
accuracy, i.e., the performance of the evaluated party itself, the evaluator’s observation 
of the performance which may lead to observation bias, and the evaluator’s memory 
about the result of the observation (memory bias) (Wherry and Bartlett, 1982). This 
study focuses on the last two points that are beyond the control of the evaluated party 
or the employee but rely on the evaluator. In the context of online transportation, it is 
expected that the evaluator should be fair and unbiased in evaluating the driver. 
Economic research has stated that inefficiencies in the bonus-or-terminate 
incentive scheme decrease when employees are evaluated more frequently (Maestri 
2014). Gong et al. (2019) supported that supervisors tend to provide greater leniency 
bias to avoid the social and economic cost of providing accurate performance ratings, 
especially for a low-performer employee under uncertain conditions. Thus, more 
frequent use of online transportation services leads users to provide a more lenient 
rating. Besides, since the meeting between a user and a driver is somehow cross-
sectional (non-recurring) in nature, as well as the evaluator is the outsider of the drivers’ 
company, the potential consequence in the evaluation is a spontaneous and relatively 
naive evaluation, given limited information had by the evaluator for consideration. In 
other words, more frequent use of the services causes increasingly less attention to the 
evaluation process, which can produce a biased rating. In contrast, less frequent use of 
services leads to a lower possibility of bias as the attention of the evaluation process is 
still high. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1: The frequency of use of online transportation services positively affects leniency 
bias. 
 
Evaluation time chosen by the evaluator relates to memory, whether it is immediate 
or postponed after the driver's service is completed. The theory of memory states that 
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the remembering process is closely related to the bias in the observed perceived 
behavior (Wherry and Bartlett, 1982). It explains the tendency of bias when 
performance evaluation is not done immediately after the employee completes the 
performance. As a result, there will be a bias when performance evaluation is postponed 
because some of the existing information and feelings may have been reduced or lost. 
The ratings given immediately after the performance observation period will be more 
accurate than those given after a long period (Wherry and Bartlett, 1982). Therefore, 
evaluation given right after the service will results in more accurate than postponed 
evaluation. In other words, biased evaluation more likely to occur when there is a time 
between the service usage and the evaluation. Thus, the following hypothesis is 
proposed: 
H2: Evaluation timing of online transportation services positively affects leniency bias. 
 
The interaction between the evaluator and the evaluated party can affect the 
effectiveness of performance evaluation (Goffin and Anderson, 2007). The interaction 
of the principal and agent in online transportation occurs during the services. It means 
that travel distance and duration affect the evaluator’s observation and its effectiveness. 
Economic researchers found that in order to produce an unbiased subjective evaluation, 
evaluators should devote time and effort to gather adequate information regarding 
employee performance. Lack of information and the closeness between the evaluator 
and the evaluated party cause leniency bias, i.e., loose in assessing, and centralizing 
bias, i.e., rating around standard values (Bol 2011). Another bias found by other 
researchers is favoritism, that is, the evaluator acts on personal preference to the 
employee by preferring one or more employees to the others (Ittner et al., 2003; 
Prendergast and Topel, 1993, 1996). This bias makes it difficult to distinguish whether 
the good rating comes from the biased or unbiased evaluation. In the context of this 
industry, it is possible for evaluators who travel with a long time and distances to obtain 
more information regarding the driver’s performance. Evaluators will have more 
chances to assess the driver’s performance better. Therefore, the distance and travel 
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duration of service is expected to decrease the bias in evaluating performance. Thus, 
the hypothesis is proposed as follows: 
H3: Travel distance and duration of online transportation services negatively affect 
leniency bias. 
 
Altruism is the source of asymmetry in avoiding unfair evaluation, which can lead 
to leniency bias (Golman and Bhatia, 2012). In a workplace setting, which agent’s 
performance is unverifiable and the usage of double incentives (positive and negative), 
it was found that altruism increases the credibility of positive incentives. At the same 
time, it decreases the credibility of negative incentives (Dur and Tichem, 2015). When 
the evaluator’s altruism is high, the evaluator will not monitor the agent’s performance 
even if the agent keeps the best performance (Giebe and Gürtler, 2012). The nature of 
wanting to help others, which in this case is the driver, encourages the evaluator to 
provide an evaluation rating that may be better than the driver should have based on his 
performance. The hypothesis is also driven by the fact that Indonesian people are more 
collectivist than individualist in the perspective of national culture (Hofstede, 2018). 
The low score of the individualism dimension of Indonesia means the existence of 
higher social preference rather than individual preference. People tend to help each 
other because of the feeling of high interdependence, among others. Therefore, the 
result of the performance evaluation can be more biased. Thus, the following hypothesis 
is proposed: 
H4: The altruism of online transportation services users positively affects leniency bias. 
 
Specific arrangements that facilitate the increase in bias, such as the knowledge 
that the rating will have a direct effect on the evaluated party, may decrease the accuracy 
of the evaluator (Wherry and Bartlett, 1982). In the case of online transportation, a good 
rating will lead to a bonus or reward for the drivers. In contrast, the poor rating will lead 
to a penalty or dismissal of the drivers. When the evaluators understand how their 
evaluation will impact the driver, the evaluator will tend to decrease the accuracy of his 
evaluation to provide a higher rating. Otherwise, when the evaluators are less 
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knowledgeable regarding the incentives system, they will give a more objective 
evaluation or even lower than the expected level. The preference to provide a higher 
and lower rating as the presence of incentives knowledge is due to the intention of users 
to minimize the negative effect they may cause to the drivers. Marchegiani et al. (2016) 
supported this prediction by stating that failing to reward a high-performer is more 
detrimental than failing to rewarding low-performer agents, which motivates evaluators 
to be more lenient. Thus, the hypothesis is proposed as follows: 
H5: Knowledge of the incentive scheme of online transportation services users 
positively affects leniency bias. 
 
Based on the hypotheses above, the theoretical framework of this research as follows. 
 
 
Figure 1.  
Theoretical framework 
 
3. Research Method 
Data for this study were collected by administering an online survey during May 
2018 to reach users of online transportation throughout Indonesia. This study utilized a 
convenience sampling method by applying criteria that respondents should be between 
17-64 years old and have ever used online transportation services. This age criteria 
refers to the range of productive age in Indonesia (BPS, 2018) and ensures the ability 
and maturity to provide a performance evaluation. The data were analyzed using 
multiple regression analysis in SPSS. 
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This study uses one dependent variable (i.e., performance evaluation bias) and five 
independent variables (i.e., frequency of service, evaluation timing, travel distance and 
duration, altruism, and knowledge of incentive scheme). The dependent variable and 
two independent variables (i.e., altruism and knowledge of incentive scheme) are pre-
tested for validity and reliability. The operational definitions and measurements of those 
variables are explained below. 
Performance Evaluation Bias. Performance evaluation bias in this study is the 
leniency bias, which is defined as a bias that occurs when the rating is given is always 
high regardless of the quality of the actual performance. The measurement of this 
variable is based on the total of the result of choice on five statements with a 5-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 “strongly disagree” to 5 “strongly agree,” as presented in 
Appendix” The higher the sum of the five-question items’ score, leniency bias tends 
more to exist. Cronbach’s alpha of this variable is 0.747 (reliable). 
Frequency of Service Use. The frequency of service use is defined as the frequency 
or number of user’s online transportation usage within a month. The higher the usage, 
the higher the frequency of use will be. This variable is measured by the respondent’s 
choice over five categories of service usage amount. The categories include usage 
frequency range per month: 1-10 times, 11-20 times, 21-30 times, 31-50 times, and 
more than 50 times. 
Evaluation Timing. Evaluation timing is the evaluation given by the user after the 
expiration of the use of online transportation service. Generally, evaluation time is 
divided into immediately after service and postponed (with time lag since the 
completion of the service, usually when the user re-open the application). Evaluation 
timing is measured by a dummy variable to differentiate the immediate and postponed 
evaluation. Score 1 is for immediate valuation, while score 0 is for postponed 
evaluation. This dummy variable is determined based on the respondents’ responses. 
Travel Distance and Duration. Travel distance and duration are defined as the 
length of travel taken by users in using the services of online transportation. The longer 
the distance kilometers and duration of service use, the higher the travel distance and 
duration will be. This variable is measured by providing five choices of travel distance 
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and duration, which are then labeled from 1 to 5 divided based on the number of 
kilometers and minutes of each travel. Score 1 is for 5-15 minutes (1-5 km) travel, score 
2 is for 16-30 minutes (6-10 km) travel, score 3 is for 31-45 minutes (11-15 km) travel, 
score 4 is for 46-60 minutes (16-20 km) travel, and score 5 is for more than 50 minutes 
(more than 20 km) travel. The equivalence between travel distance and travel duration 
uses approximation need for travel in real condition. 
Altruism. Altruism is the extent of willingness to help others voluntarily related to 
their work efforts. This variable is measured by the  Smith et al. altruism scale (1983) 
used by (Podsakoff et al. 1990), which consists of five statements with a 7-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 “strongly disagree” to 7 “strongly agree” as presented in 
Appendix. Cronbach’s alpha of this variable is 0.755 (reliable). 
Knowledge of Incentives Scheme. Knowledge of incentives scheme is the level of 
understanding of users as evaluators of incentives scheme implemented by online 
transportation service providers for driver performance. This knowledge is measured 
by five statements giving the option of a 5-point Likert scale consisting of 1 “do not 
know at all” to 5 “know for sure” as presented in the Appendix. Cronbach’s alpha of 
this variable is 0.769 (reliable). 
Before hypothesis testing, validity test and reliability test were performed. 
Subsequently, a descriptive statistical test was performed, and the data were analyzed 
using multiple linear regression to test the hypothesis. The classical assumption test 
consisted of tests of normality, heteroscedasticity, and multicollinearity. The level of 
significance was set at 5%, as suggested in social science research (Sekaran and Bougie, 
2016). 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
The data were obtained through online surveys filled by users of online 
transportation in various cities in Indonesia. For further analysis, this research used 163 
usable and complete of 172 data from 35 cities and 18 provinces in Indonesia. Table 1 
and Table 2 shows the demographic information and descriptive statistics of the 
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respondents, respectively. The average of the respondents’ age is 23.05 years, with the 
range from 18 to 45 years old. Most users are 21-30 years old. It means that the majority 
of the users are late adolescence and early adults. About 73.6% of the respondents are 
women. Most of the respondents graduated from bachelor's degree and senior high 
school with a percentage of 58.9% and 34.4%, respectively. The majority of the 
respondents have no working experience  (44.8 %) or have working experience of fewer 
than three years (44.8%). The mean score of the performance evaluation bias variable 
was 21.23 of 25, indicating the tendency of high leniency bias in performance 
evaluation. 
Table 1.  
Demographic Information 
 
Category No. of respondents % 
Ages   
 18-20 
21-30 
31-40 
41-45 
30 
125 
7 
1 
18.40 
76.69 
4.29 
0.61 
Gender   
 Man 
Woman 
43 
120 
26.38 
73.62 
Education   
 Senior high school 
Diploma degree 
Bachelor degree 
Master degree 
56 
5 
96 
6 
34.36 
3.07 
58.90 
3.68 
Work Experience   
 No experience 
< 1 year 
1-3 years 
3-5 years 
> 5 years 
73 
36 
37 
8 
9 
44.79 
22.09 
22.70 
4.91 
5.52 
Total usable data 163 100 
 
Most respondents have experienced using multiple types of transportation services 
and platforms. One hundred and thirteen people have used Go-Ride provided by Go-
Jek, while 93 people have experienced GrabBike from Grab. In-car service, 107 people 
have used Go-Car or Go-Taxi provided by Go-Jek, and 105 people have used GrabCar 
or GrabTaxi from Grab. However, outside of those two large platforms, other platforms 
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also provide the same services. Thirty-one people have experienced these other 
platforms’ services. This data shows that the existence of various platforms is used 
interchangeably by the user.  
Table 2.  
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
Age 18.00 45.00 23.0491 3.57254 
Education 1.00 4.00 2.3190 0.99198 
Work experience 0.00 4.00 1.0429 1.17247 
Frequency of usage 1.00 5.00 1.3252 0.76887 
Travel distance and duration 2.00 8.00 3.7791 1.31480 
Altruism 11.00 35.00 26.2515 4.77822 
Knowledge of incentives scheme 9.00 25.00 21.8773 3.56210 
Leniency bias 15.00 25.00 21.2270 2.18101 
 
Table 3 shows the Pearson correlations matrix for all variables in this research. 
The correlation coefficient between the frequency of use and leniency bias is 0.162 
(p<0.05, two-tailed). Correlations are also found between altruism and knowledge of 
incentives scheme either altruism and leniency bias with coefficients of -0.012 (p<0.01, 
two-tailed) and -0.297 (p<0.01, two-tailed), respectively. Knowledge of incentives 
scheme and leniency bias are correlated at the coefficient of 0.580 (p<0.01, two-tailed). 
This initial correlation analysis shows that altruism and knowledge of incentives are 
significantly correlated to leniency bias. Besides, knowledge of incentives scheme is 
significantly correlated to the altruism. These are the initial findings of this research. 
Table 3.  
Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Frequency of use 1.000      
2. Evaluation timing 0.007 1.000     
3. Travel distance and duration -0.148 0.031 1.000    
4. Altruism -0.007 -0.087 0.109 1.000   
5. Knowledge of incentives sch. 0.116 -0.010 -0.012 -0.205** 1.000  
6. Leniency bias 0.162* -0.090 -0.129 -0.297** 0.580** 1.000 
** significant at 5% 
Before testing the hypotheses, the analysis for non-response bias was performed 
by comparing the first and last 30 responses (Moore and Tarnai, 2002). The result shows 
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that there is no significant difference between early dan late responses for all variables, 
except for variable Altruism. However, potential non-response bias for variable 
Altruism is not a major concern, considering that all other variables are statistically 
insignificant   
The result of the regression analysis is presented in Table 4. The adjusted R square 
of the regression is 0.382, which means that independent variables explain 38.2% of 
variances of the dependent variable. The model standard error of the estimate is 1.715 
(less than SD=2.181). The F-test is 21.01 (p=0.000), which means that the independent 
variables in the model simultaneously affect Leniency Bias as the dependent variable. 
Test of control variables was conducted to ensure that factors outside the model do not 
affect leniency bias. Age, Gender, Education, and Work Experience are found 
insignificantly correlated with the bias. 
Table 4.  
Regression Analysis Result 
 
Model 
Expected 
Sign 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
β Std. Error Beta 
(Constant)  12.685 1.174  10.801 0.000 
Frequency of Use Positive 0.236 0.178 0.083 1.323 0.188 
Evaluation Timing Positive -0.311 0.302 -0.064 -1.031 0.304 
Travel Distance and Duration Negative -0.215** 0.104 -0.129 -2.058 0.041 
Altruism Positive 0.090*** 0.029 0.197 3.092 0.002 
Knowledge of Incentives Sch. Positive 0.323*** 0.039 0.528 8.304 0.000 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
H1 stated that the Frequency of Online Transportation Usage affects Leniency Bias 
positively. However, the result shows that the effect is insignificant (β=0.236, p=0.188). 
This result means that an evaluation bias was not affected by the frequency of online 
transportation usage. Therefore, H1 was not supported. The result was also not 
supported H2, which proposed a positive effect of Evaluation Timing on Leniency Bias 
(β=-0.311, p=0.304). It means that evaluation bias was also not affected by choice of 
timing in evaluating online transportation driver performance. 
H3 stated that Travel Distance and Duration negatively affect Leniency Bias by 
providing evaluator information to make a judgment about the rating. The result 
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supports the proposed hypothesis (β=-0.215, p<0.041). This result is consistent with the 
theory that the longer the travel distance and duration, the more information obtained 
by the evaluator about the driver’s performance. Therefore, the increased information 
leads to a lower possibility of biased rating. 
H4 proposed that Altruism positively affects performance evaluation bias, i.e., 
Leniency Bias. The result is consistent with the hypothesis (β=0.090, p<0.002). 
Descriptive results of this variable showed a score of 26.25 of 35.00, which revealed 
that users tend to be more altruistic, especially towards the driver. It means that altruism 
is a determinant of leniency bias, where the online transportation users are more willing 
to help the drivers working in the company. Therefore, H4 was supported. 
The result in Table 4 also shows the result of H5, which stated that the Knowledge 
of Incentives Scheme also has a positive effect on Leniency Bias. The result shows the 
support for the hypothesis (β=0.323, p=0.000). The descriptive results also revealed that 
most of the users have known and understood the incentives scheme applied to the 
driver’s working company with a score of 21.88 of 25.00. 
Three of five hypotheses in this paper were supported, including the negative effect 
of travel distance and duration and the positive effect of both altruism and knowledge 
of incentives scheme on performance evaluation (leniency) bias. The two remaining 
hypotheses were not supported due to the following possible reasons. 
The frequency of use does not significantly affect evaluation bias, meaning that 
more frequent use using of services does not correlate with the level of evaluation bias. 
This finding does not support the argument that more frequent usage of services leads 
to a more lenient rating. Likewise, less frequent usage also does not result in lower 
leniency bias. Condly et al. (2003) suggested that the learning effect may increase 
performance through the increase in skill and other efforts related to performance. In 
this context, the intended 'performance' is not the drivers' performance but the users' 
performance (ability) in providing a subjective evaluation. On the other side, the users 
who rarely use the services still have great attention to the evaluation process, so they 
remain trying to provide a more accurate rating. Thus, no significant finding in the 
relationship between the variables. 
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Evaluation timing also does not significantly affect the evaluation bias. No 
difference of leniency bias level between which generated from evaluation with and 
without time lag after services indicates that users tend to give a consistent rating all 
the time. It can be the impact of halo theory. Halo effect refers to the tendency to think 
that person in general as rather good or inferior and make a judgment of the specific 
attributes by the general feeling (Baker et al., 1994; O’Donnell and Schsultz, 2005). 
Online transportation users generate the next rating based on their perception built on 
early experience. Then evaluators try to make the current evaluation consistent with the 
prior performance (Fehrenbacher, Schulz, and Rotaru 2018). That is, when the first or 
prior experience leads them to provide a good (bad) rating, it can build a perception that 
online transportation drivers always give excellent (poor) service. Then the users 
continue to bring the perception to the evaluation of next service orders. If the first 
impression is good (bad), the subsequent perception can even diminish the bad (good) 
events effect on the rating because users likely (unlikely) try to understand the 
underlying reason or situation of the drivers’ behavior at the time of service. Thus, 
evaluation timing does not affect the evaluation bias since the halo effect causes most 
evaluations to tend to be constantly following the first-time use evaluation. This finding 
denies the prediction that newer memory will result in more objective evaluation. 
The other argument to explain the insignificant effect of evaluation timing is that 
the limited time users had to provide a rating. Due to the rapid and rush activity, the use 
of online transportation is intended to help users to expedite their movement. Under this 
situation, users do not have enough time to determine the exact rating of the driver. 
Prior literature suggests that intuition mode of subjective evaluation, which is fast and 
effortless cognitive processing, leads to rapid judgment relied more on prior beliefs and 
knowledge (Fehrenbacher, Schulz, and Rotaru 2018; Evans 2008). Therefore, 
evaluation tends to be biased for either given immediately after the services or 
postponed, or in other words, there is no difference between those two evaluation 
timings. 
More travel distance and duration in H3 provide more opportunity to gather more 
or even complete information for making a rating decision. In line with Bol (2011), 
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more accurate transportation comes from judgment based on enough information. More 
information is obtained through communication during the services, either verbally or 
nonverbally. This finding is also consistent with Goffin and Anderson (2007). They 
suggest that more extended interaction among evaluators and evaluated parties results 
in a more effective evaluation because it provides more opportunities to identify the 
evaluated party. Therefore, adding in travel distance and duration means a reduction in 
leniency bias. 
As previously defined, altruism is one of personality which refers to a willingness 
to help other people, regardless of the observed behavior. The support on H4 suggests 
that more altruistic the users, the more biased evaluation they generate. The evaluation 
is not genuinely based on the actual performance, but based on the extent of users’ 
empathy, which to help the drivers avoid penalty or termination. Therefore, users 
choose to give a lenient rating. This result can be potentially supported by the fact of 
the stable, increasing number of online transportation drivers in Indonesia, which leads 
to a more competitive working environment for the drivers. Altruistic people were more 
concerned and paying attention to this fact. They also generate biased evaluations to 
help the drivers face a harsh working environment. This finding result supports previous 
research examining altruism effect on behavior. It is consistent with the prior study, for 
instance, by Golman and Bhatia (2012), which stated that altruism causes leniency bias. 
In each type of incentive, positive incentives become more credible, but, on the 
contrary, negative incentives tend to be less credible (Dur and Tichem, 2015). Users do 
not pay attention any longer to the drivers’ effort since the altruistic trait directs users 
to give a good rating (Giebe and Gürtler, 2012). 
Support on H5 reveals that Knowledge of Incentives Scheme positively affects 
performance evaluation bias, which is leniency bias. Consistent with the prior study 
(Wherry and Bartlett, 1982), people who know the impact of their evaluation on the 
evaluated party tend to be more considerate. It results in the high rating assigned for the 
drivers. Furthermore, this result is also supported by the correlation found between the 
knowledge of the incentives scheme and altruism performed in the Pearson correlation 
analysis. Knowledge of the incentives scheme motivates users as the evaluator to give 
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a more lenient rating for the drivers to save the driver from getting penalty/termination. 
The knowledge leads to understanding and empathy, which encourages the users to help 
the drivers avoid negative incentives. This bias generating behavior shows how users 
respond to the drivers working pressure. 
 
5. Conclusion, Implication, and Limitation 
The purpose of this study is to examine factors influencing bias in performance 
evaluation of the online transportation drivers in Indonesia. The results of this study 
generally support that biased evaluation is more affected by the internal factors of the 
evaluator, including altruistic personality and knowledge, that encourage them to give 
higher ratings in general. On the other hand, the external factors of the users, i.e., 
frequency of use and evaluation timing, do not affect their judgment regarding driver 
performance evaluation. Travel distance and duration are the only external factor that 
negatively affects the leniency bias. These results are consistent with most of the 
previous studies of evaluation bias. 
The result of this study is in line with the Indonesian people's characteristics, who 
are more collectivist and showing helpfulness to each other. Due to the sensitive 
incentives scheme applied by online transportation operators, the users strive to help 
drivers to maintain their work by giving above-average performance ratings. 
Nevertheless, the long-term effect of this users’ behavior needs further research to 
identify whether it leads to the negative impact like have been investigated in the prior 
study (e.g., Golman and Bhatia, 2012); Bol, 2011). 
This study provides either theoretical and practical implications. Theoretically, this 
research implies that the evaluator’s helpful characteristics and deeper information 
related to the evaluated party can lead to bias in performance evaluation. Meanwhile, 
in practical terms, this research implies that online transportation providers should be 
more conservative in interpreting a high rating of the drivers since the presence of 
leniency bias is identified in the performance evaluation. It means that the company 
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should provide an education to the users regarding the need to be objective in 
performing the drivers’ evaluation. 
This study has several limitations. First, nonresponse bias was found on one 
independent variable even though this bias was not a major concern. Future research 
may more consider this bias. Second, this research did not take other kinds of bias (e.g., 
centrality bias) into consideration, which can potentially affect the provision of 
performance evaluation. Future research can develop the investigation into the multiple 
types of evaluation bias. Furthermore, future research can also involve more 
determinants of performance evaluation bias and build a categorization of those 
determinants other than internal-external factors. 
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Appendix 
Altruism 
Question 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. In the workplace/school, I help others who have 
been absent. 
       
2. In the workplace/school, I help others who have 
heavy workloads. 
       
3. In the workplace/school, I help orient new people 
even though it is not required. 
       
4. In the workplace/school, I will help others who 
have work-related problems. 
       
5. In the workplace/school, I am always ready to 
lend a helping hand to those around me. 
       
Description: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree 
 
Knowledge of incentives scheme 
Question 1 2 3 4 5 
1. I know that the income of online transportation drivers is 
based on the number of passengers or the services they obtain 
     
2. I know that online transportation driver incentives/bonuses 
are based on the number of passengers or more services 
obtained after the minimum target is reached. 
     
3. I know that the service rating that I provide as a passenger 
greatly influences driver income. 
     
4. I know that a bad rating (for example, 1 star) can cause a 
driver to be suspended or unable to provide service for a 
certain period of time. 
     
5. I know that a bad rating given by several passengers can 
cause drivers to be terminated by the company. 
     
Description: 1 = do not know at all, 5 = know for sure 
 
Leniency bias 
Question 1 2 3 4 5 
1. I always give a high rating regardless of the level of the actual 
performance of the driver. 
     
2. I always give a high rating even though there is an unpleasant 
attitude or behavior of the driver. 
     
3. I always give a high rating even though the driver picks up a 
bit longer than estimated in the application. 
     
4. I always give a high rating even though there are SOPs 
(standard procedures) left by drivers, for example, not 
offering masks. 
     
5. I always give a high rating even though the driver only 
speaks as needed to me. 
     
Description: 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree 
